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Plato's true speculative greatness, that in virtue of which he 
constitutes an epoch in the history of philosophy and hence in 
world history generally, lies in the more precise identification of 
the idea,  a recognition which, a few centuries later, was in 
general to form the basic element in the ferment of world history 
and a new configuration of the human spirit. 
               Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy1  
 
1. Beyond Plato And Hegel  
      For Hegel, the 'idea' is far more than a mere Platonic invention, one among many 
technical terms to gain currency in philosophy. On the contrary, it is the proper and 
essential object of thought, and as such its development forms the principal theme of 
philosophical history. The initial identification of the idea thus coincides with the advent 
of a thinking which for the first time knows what its true content is, which in the idea has 
the unity of thinking and being clearly before it, and Plato is rightly seen as the founder 
of this knowledge of the idea to which he gave the name 'philosophy'. The subsequent 
career of this science Hegel represents as the "labour of the concept" whereby, over two 
millennia and more, this ideal knowledge is further deepened and widened. Over 
centuries of Christian culture the speculative spirit initiated among the Greeks was to 
become a matter of inward and outward habit, and, as the spirit of modernity, is born 
again in the self-consciousness of freedom. Modern philosophy proceeds from the 
principle of freedom as an intellectual and moral certainty toward the systematic 
comprehension of it as the basis of all scientific and ethical truth; a labour consummated 
in the Hegelian science in which the enterprise Plato inaugurated finds a certain 
                                                
1 Die wahrhaft spekulative Grösse Platons, das, wodurch er Epoche macht in der Geschichte der Philosophy 
und damit in der Weltgeschichte überhaupt, ist die nähere Bestimmung der Idee,  eine Erkenntnis, welche 
denn einige Jahrhunderte später überhaupt das Grundelement in der Gärung der Weltgeschichte und der 
neuen Gestaltung des menschlichen Geistes ausmacht. (Werke, Moldenhauer/Michel, Frankfurt am Main, 
1971, v19, p.66) 
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completion.2 "The goal that I set myself" declares Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
"is that Philosophy more closely approach the form of science -- that it reach the point 
where it can set aside its title as the love of knowing [Liebe zum Wissen, philo-sophia] 
and become an actual knowing [wirkliches Wissen]."3  
      It is this view of philosophical history as having in some sense reached its term that 
the ultra-modernist critics of Hegel immediately take up, though their understanding of 
that consummation and his do not simply differ: rather, they are notoriously at odds.4 
Notorious also is the fact that it is not Hegel's view of philosophical history, the 
appreciation of which is rare enough, that has profoundly shaped how the matter is seen 
today, but rather the views of these his 19th-20th century critics. In Feuerbach or 
Nietzsche, in Russell or Heidegger, in Rorty or Derrida we not only find Western 
philosophy represented as a completed history but also this completion set forth as the 
negative major premise of their own peculiar account of the bankruptcy of that tradition, 
whether seen as springing from intellectual fallacies at long last exposed and refuted, or 
as the long-standing corruption of an original human wisdom now standing in need of 
radical reconstitution. The critique of a putative 'Hegelian' account of the upshot of 
philosophical history becomes the springboard for an attack on the tradition as a whole 
and an attempt to delineate an entirely post-philosophical way of thinking.  
      The meaning of this post-modern rebellion against philosophy is not easily assessed. 
Where Hegel saw in the modern affirmation of freedom the triumph of the philosophical 
idea, his successors, standing already in and beyond that event, take their freedom as 
given and seek only to resolve it to some more immediate, political or existential, form. 
In relation to such resolution a philosophically comprehended freedom appears as a 
limiting obstacle: freedom as idea becomes the enemy of freedom as actual life. Hegel's 
successors could not (and still cannot) imagine how a freedom brought to consciousness 
through the exercise of reason and mediated by some definite ethical and historical 
culture could ever be an absolute freedom, in the (questionable) sense of a this-worldly, 
here-and-now freedom  a human freedom. From this perspective, accordingly, the 
philosophical tradition appears as having achieved no more than to have nurtured and 
brought to completeness an ideal freedom only, the mere ought-to-be of moral 
conscience. It thus appears to the heirs of this legacy above all necessary to be liberated 
decisively from that tradition, precisely and paradoxically in order that the all-important 
principle which it had engendered and brought to light might be transformed into 
actuality.  
      It is in accordance with some such extreme hostility toward philosophy and its history 
that the counter-Hegelian revolution began and is still pursued. For the generation for 
whom a strictly human freedom became an absolute premise and fact it seemed 
                                                
2 "This movement, which is philosophy, finds itself already completed when in the end it grasps its own 
concept, i.e., simply looks back on its knowledge." (Hegel, Encyclopedia; Werke 10. s.573) See also the 
conclusion to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Werke, 20, p.460). 
3 Werke, 3, p.14. 
4 See Jackson, F.L. "Post-Modernism and the Recovery of the Philosophical Tradition", in Animus, vol.1 
(1996). 
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imperative that the commitment to ideas, 'idealism', upon which Western culture as a 
whole is founded, be finally identified, exposed and abandoned. For the history of 
philosophy is seen as the history of the abstraction of freedom only, of its merely 
'spiritual', i.e., moral-intellectual expression. It will be argued that actual freedom, 
freedom as a palpable human self-experience and a principle of concrete political and 
material relations, had been wrenched from the context of real life and installed 
somewhere in the sky, there afforded a holy-ghostly existence accessible only in the 
otherworldly intuitions of art, religion and philosophy. Various hypotheses are advanced 
to account for this fatal turn to idealism. Typical (the version with which we will here 
primarily be concerned) is the hypothesis of a cultural catastrophe in which an original 
harmony between Nature and Spirit is somehow broken and the original priority of the 
former over the latter is reversed. The real is then made subordinate to Thought, the truth 
of Being is obscured or forgotten, State and Technology become master over 
Individuality and Life. So deprived of his natural freedom man is dehumanized; 
Theology, Metaphysics and Morality become the universal opiates through which this 
alienated condition is sustained. Though the various forms of this 19th-20th century 
metaphor are in content often contradictory (Marx is no Kierkegaard) they all have the 
same objective: to liberate life from the domination of reason, to affirm freedom as 
preeminent human nature, to declare the world-for-thought as utterly incompatible with a 
human world of freedom. To this end it becomes especially necessary above all to 
undermine the whole cult and culture of the idea; to repudiate 'philosophy' as Plato 
initiated it and Hegel completed it.  
      The task to which post-Hegelian thinking thus enthusiastically applied itself was the 
discovery of the adequate critique of the Western spiritual and intellectual tradition, such 
as could lay the basis for a new ultra-spiritual standpoint both comprehensive of it and 
liberated from it. The common metaphor is a 'return to nature' in some fashion, whether 
through the romanticist invocation of an ante-historical spirit  the preeminence of culture  
or the substitution of natural science for metaphysics as absolute knowledge. The former 
seeks to disclose and rehabilitate a pristine life and wisdom alleged to have been 
suppressed and corrupted by a domineering modern intellect which "murders to dissect". 
The latter opposes any such great leap backward and proposes a revolutionary 
emancipation from everything past, appealing to a new theology and psychology of the 
natural, Darwinian man. But the wish common to both is altogether to have done with the 
reason-ridden, idea-world of philosophy and to rediscover (or open up) entirely 
aboriginal (or entirely new) territories beyond the realm of the rational and a merely 
moral good and evil.  
      This ultra-modernist program is of course ambiguous at its core. It is one thing simply 
to abandon thought as empty and useless activity. But how could it ever be possible to 
demonstrate the invalidity of philosophical reason; by what new standard and in what 
other form of discourse could the case be made against it? It is our limited purpose here 
to survey how Nietzsche and Heidegger generally answered this question; how they 
reconstructed, indeed inverted, the spiritual history of the West to tell of a virginal Greek 
wisdom become sullied and perverted through the encroachments of a life-denying, 
otherworldly mentality; how Plato formalized this Socratic falsification in his theory of 
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ideas; how he founded thereby a regimen of self-deception called 'philosophy' which 
provided the seedbed for a vast cultural growth devoted to the sustaining of this life-
repressive mentality; how this spiritual cancer spread and grew, reaching its deadly finale 
in and as Modernity.  
      In spite of its prima facie implausibility, this tragic, high-operatic account of the 
intellectual history of the West still exercises enormous influence upon contemporary 
thinking; the more recent heroes of continental philosophy still perpetuate it.5 With both 
Nietzsche and Heidegger the beginning is typically made with a claim to an epoch-
making insight into the essential 'nihilism' of modernity as the final embodiment of a 
legacy of spiritual degeneration going back in time.6 The root cause of this cultural decay, 
or at least its crucial symptomatic expression, is declared to be epitomized in the 
historical cult of philosophy which as a matter of course elevates thought above life, 
plays down the sensible world as 'mere appearance', and seeks to comprehend and 
subordinate living reality under intellectual principles, the so-called ideas. The history of 
philosophy is thus, as Nietzsche puts it, the history of a lie whose consequence is just 
nihilism, the culture-negative culture of modernity.  
      The radical deconstruction and reconstruction of the history of philosophy thus 
becomes a chief means of defending  'philosophically'  a romanticist insight into the 
decadence of modernity that would otherwise remain aesthetic or dogmatic only. For 
since the very nature of the thesis in hand  the 'lie' underlying philosophy  precludes any 
directly philosophical explication or defence, it can appear possible to justify it only 
through a radical reinterpretation of the history of that discipline itself with a view to 
exposing its real burden and intent as quite the opposite of what had ever been supposed. 
There will be required a radical rereading of original texts in order to ferret out and define 
the alleged fundamental misapprehension upon which Plato founded his ideal world, this 
then to form the basis of a complete retelling of the tale of European cultural history 
recast as the progressive compounding of this misapprehension until it reaches its 
apotheosis in modern humanism. The traditional-Hegelian spiritual history of the West is 
utterly and deliberately turned on its head.  
      So established and refined has this post-philosophical narrative become since 
Nietzsche's time that appreciation for the original sense of traditional philosophical texts 
is now rare enough, an indifference reinforced by a new conviction that respect for 
manifest argument is in any case no longer obligatory; one must rather look for (or 
invent?) a surreptitious, unconscious, and usually contradictory meaning lurking behind 
                                                
5 See postscript on Derrida in section 5, this essay. 
6 Ambivalence with respect to terms like 'spirit' or 'spiritual' pervades the whole tradition represented by 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. Like most post-Hegelians they were generally loathe to use the word except 
disparagingly; yet they were equally clear the crisis they would describe and address was a 'spiritual' one, in 
the sense it was at once intellectual, moral, political, aesthetic, religious  i.e., 'cultural'. The new worldliness 
to which they would lead the return is not a materialism but wholly presupposes a concrete freedom: 'spirit' 
in the distinctively Hegelian sense. Heidegger himself will declare "World is always the world of spirit", 
but see Derrida's revealing account as to how he continually vacillated over whether or how to use the term: 
whether negatively, positively, figuratively etc.: Of Spirit, Heidegger and the Question, tr. 
Bennington/Bowlby (Chicago, 1989). 
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what is obviously and overtly reasoned. Counter-textual hypotheses of this kind have 
accordingly come to be taken as gospel: with respect to Plato and Parmenides on the 
relation of being and thought, for example, Heidegger is taken much at his word, as is 
Nietzsche on the perversity of morality or Derrida on identity. Yet even the most 
superficial inspection will show that the interpretations of classical texts upon which such 
claims are based are often conspicuously cavalier, clearly bent and amended to serve a 
distinctly post-modern outlook.  
      Much has been written as to whether Nietzsche's or Heidegger's specific accounts of 
the classical legacy are valid in literary or scholarly terms; however, more thought needs 
to be directed to the question of the philosophical motives which inspired these. The 
interpretative liberties taken were certainly extreme and cannot be attributed to 
wrongheadedness or an invidious will to distort and deceive  we are dealing, after all, 
with the best minds of recent centuries. But there is need to examine the limits of the very 
task they set themselves, namely to formulate a deliberately 'post-philosophical' 
standpoint, one which could claim at once to have liberated itself from all the historical 
mediations of philosophy while justifying and sustaining this independence precisely by 
appeal to that same history. Such a thinking is radically divided in itself; exempting itself 
in principle from any appeal to a legacy of rational argument, it would sustain itself 
nonetheless through endlessly worrying that same legacy, exploiting by means of extreme 
and oblique interpretations the very literature from whose substance and upshot it 
declares itself already free. In so assuming what it negates in order to negate what it 
assumes, it will inevitably taint everything it finds with its own ambiguity in that 
literature.  
 
2. Nietzsche's Plato.  
      The iconoclastic rhetoric of the 19th century ultra-modernists was driven by the 
extremity of what they attempted. Schopenhauer and Comte, Kierkegaard and Feuerbach, 
Marx and Nietzsche took similar recourse to violent polarizations and epochistic history, 
the positions articulated not meant to be understood merely as discontinuous with the 
Western moral and intellectual tradition but as consciously subversive of it. Their radical 
counter-histories were not constructed on behalf of some new philosophical standpoint; 
on the contrary, they were meant to undermine and deconstruct the philosophical 
tradition as a whole, a step they saw to be prerequisite to the maintenance of positions 
that could not otherwise even be rendered intelligible. Accordingly we find the history of 
Western philosophy represented, not simply as riddled with misapprehensions regarding 
logical or living truths, but as a dark legacy of deliberate falsification and corruption of 
the very truth itself. Metaphysics, morality and theology are singled out as prime villains 
in a fallacy-driven melodrama of cultural descent into moral and intellectual decadence. 
The need to expose their nihilistic essence and to loosen their grip on the human spirit 
poses the principal challenge. An entirely new kind of thinking is proposed such as will 
presuppose, as its own essential premise, the very speculative legacy it seeks at the same 
time to undermine.  
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       As Western philosophy traces its own roots to the Greeks, it is with the Greeks that 
the deconstruction of the tradition must also begin. It will seek to show how and where, 
long ago, a wrong turning was made, initiating developments whose final issue is 
nihilistic modernity. This whole undertaking entails, of course, a key presumption: that 
there actually was an ancient wisdom from which the advent of philosophy represented a 
turning-away and to which return must now somehow be made. It is required of the 
romanticist argument, not only that it declare what the great evil of modernity is, but also 
that it identify the pristine cultural outlook it is alleged to have corrupted: the two factors 
are entirely reciprocal. Kierkegaard found an instance of a pre-Socratic wisdom in the 
faith of Abraham; Schopenhauer praised Vedantic pessimism as more 'honest' than Greek 
philosophy; Heidegger proclaimed Parmenides the real unsung hero of Greek thought; 
and Nietzsche offers Zarathustra, the first divinity to overvalue the otherworldly, the 
poetic opportunity to correct his error.  
       In all cases it is with Socrates and Plato that the rot sets in and a vision of truth 
opposed to being and life firmly established. Nietzsche is everywhere blunt about this: 
they are co-authors of a world- and life-denying moralism which was to become 
constitutive of European culture; consolidated over two Christian millennia (and 
Christianity is but "Plato for the people") and attaining world-domination in modern 
enlightened humanism. The first articulation of this sinister outlook with Socrates 
coincides, Nietzsche claims, with the collapse of authentic Greek virtue, a heroic 
condition he describes as rooted in a profound sense of the priority of Life over Thought  
the former as ungrounded, self-expressive, spontaneous existence  and the corresponding 
priority of the natural over the moral will. "Will-to-power" is Nietzsche's shorthand for 
this remarkable fusion of freedom with instinct, a view that has since become common 
enough in the general culture.7 Socrates is depicted as harbinger of a perverse will-to-
power, a will turned destructively against itself and against instinctual life, a 'spiritual' or 
moral will hostile in principle to everything natural and spontaneous; thus unfree in 
Nietzsche's sense. The philosopher is the supreme epitome of this 'new' human type:  
The appearance of the Greek philosophers from Socrates onwards is a 
symptom of decadence... (WP 427). Socrates represents a moment of the 
profoundest perversity in the history of values (WP 430). [Plato] severed 
the instincts from the polis, from contest, from military efficiency, from 
art and beauty, from the mysteries, from belief in tradition and ancestors. 
He was the seducer of the nobility... He negated all the presuppositions of 
the 'noble Greek' of the old stamp, made dialectic an everyday practice, 
conspired with tyrants, pursued politics of the future and provided the 
example of the most complete severance of the instincts from the past. He 
is profound, passionate in everything anti-Hellenic (WP 35).  
       So Socrates really was the corrupter of Greek youth and Plato the despoiler of Greek 
ethical life rather than the first to discern its principle. Plato's appeal to a universal good 
                                                
7 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Tr. Kaufmann/Hollingsdale (NY, 1968), [Hereafter 'WP']. "... freedom 
understood, that is, as positive power, as will to power ...(WP 770)" "The most fearful and fundamental 
desire in man, his drive for power  this drive is called 'freedom'" (WP 720). 
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delivers the kiss of death to a uniquely Greek ethos still alive in Milesian and Ionian 
speculation and preserved, though already in decline, even among the Sophists whom 
Plato so persistently maligns.  
The real philosophers of Greece are those before Socrates  with Socrates 
something changes. They are all noble persons, setting themselves apart 
from people and state... They anticipate all the great conceptions of things: 
they themselves represent these conceptions, they bring themselves into a 
system (WP 437). The 'Sophist'  including Anaxagoras, Democritus, the 
great Ionians  is still completely Hellenic, though as a transitional form.... 
The 'philosopher', on the other hand is the reaction (WP 427). The Greek 
culture of the Sophists had developed out of all the Greek instincts; it 
belongs to the culture of the Periclean age as necessarily as Plato does not 
(WP 428).  
And what is it that uniquely belongs to the noble Greek outlook which Plato debased?  
In the Greek philosophers I see a decline of the instincts: otherwise they 
could not have blundered so far as to posit the conscious state as more 
valuable. We must in fact seek life where it has become least conscious, 
i.e., least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means and intentions, its utility 
(WP 480).  
[For] there exists neither 'spirit', nor reason, nor thinking, nor 
consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no 
use.... Belief in the body is always a stronger belief than belief in the 
spirit; and whoever desires to undermine it, also undermines at the same 
time most thoroughly belief in the authority of the spirit! (WP 659)  
Plato [is] the great viaduct of corruption, who first refused to see nature in 
morality, who had already debased the Greek gods with his concept 'good', 
who was already marked by Jewish bigotry (WP 202).  
       Startling and dramatic though this relentlessly anti-spiritual tirade may be, is there 
much that is really plausible in it? Where in the ancient chronicle or literature does one 
find anything resembling Nietzsche's descriptions of an original Greek 'virtue' expressing 
itself as an unqualified affirmation of the priority of nature over spirit, instinct over 
morality, body over mind, the unconscious over consciousness, individuality against 
"people and state". Almost everything we know of ancient peoples suggests rather the 
contrary: that far from having brought such distinctions  body/soul for example  to such 
clarity of dichotomy as would allow of choosing to 'value' one over the other, we 
typically find the converse: a marked in-distinctness of divisions between human and 
divine, aesthetic and intellectual, or spiritual and natural. Indeed, the bringing to light of 
just such categories and the working out of both their distinctness and their unity was 
precisely the work Plato began; an historic work whose result Nietzsche entirely 
presupposes.  
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      Indeed, it is only against the background of the whole Western-Platonic development 
that such ultra-modernist conjurings of a pre-rational consciousness, a morality based on 
instinct and other such romanticist notions can even be meaningful. Nietzsche's account 
of pre-Platonic Greek culture and its putative Socratic subversion does not, in short, 
derive from any first order survey of that culture itself but is the product of quite 
contemporary notions and conflicts foisted in. Appeals to para-historical narrative were 
common enough in the great age of the opera and the novel; but romanticism's interest 
was never in history itself so much as in dramatising certain of its more exotic episodes in 
order to make its own reactionary case against that particular form of modernity which 
saw in history only the endless improvement of social and material conditions. To 
Nietzsche's generation this newly dominant scientific, technocratic and political idealism 
threatened to subordinate to its vision of progress the actual freedom of living 
individuals, a freedom immediately possessed and borne witness to 'existentially', i.e., 
psychologically and aesthetically.  
      It is this post-Hegelian controversy over the meaning and consequences of modern 
freedom which Nietzsche would read back into the Greek context, there to create a point 
of departure for a critical 'genealogy' of the whole of Western culture. But a genealogy of 
moral types in epochal confrontation is not really 'history' at all but a kind of psycho-
cultural absolutism crudely grafted upon the actual record.8 Like Wagner, Nietzsche 
would recoil from the humanistic optimism of post-Hegelian times into a reconstructed 
Teutonic paganism 9 where freedom becomes a primitive affect and the natural 
individual, so empowered, the archetype of the 'noble races', prior to the encroachment of 
the so-called moral type in whom the instinct to freedom is corrupted, i.e., become un-
natural, ascetic, set against itself and against life. In short, Nietzsche's heroic narrative of 
a Greek age of virtue falling into decay and supplanted by a vulgar emphasis on a 
universal good is nothing more than a metaphor for a conflict actually raging in his own 
time: the war between freedom as existential individualism and freedom as socio-
technological humanism.  
      When it comes to specifics there are many conspicuous incongruities in Nietzsche's 
account of the Platonic argument itself. Apart from "meddling in reasons" and displacing 
the gods with the "vulgarity" of an ideal good, Plato is accused of promoting certain 
metaphysical fallacies which demonstrate his fundamental "anti-Greek prejudice". One 
example:  
                                                
8 It is important to emphasize that for Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, 'Will' is a decidedly not a practical 
category ('volition') but a psychological one. Freedom is "above all an affect" (Beyond Good and Evil 
[BGE] 19). In expressionist metaphysics generally, affect acquires the value of existence  feeling is being  
on which view psychology, not philosophy, becomes queen of the sciences (BGE 20). Existential 
philosophy may be styled 'absolute psychology', i.e., psychology no longer concerned with a separated 
mind or soul, but which makes the identity of being and self-consciousness its principle. This identity 
comes to be variously characterized as Wille, will-to-power, the unconscious, the unknowable, Life, 
Existenz, Dasein and so forth.. 
9 James Doull, "Natural Individualism", in E. Combs (ed.), Modernity and Responsibility (Toronto: U. of T. 
Press, 1983) p.40. 
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[Plato] reversed the concept "reality" and said: "What you take for the real 
is an error, and the nearer we approach the 'Idea', the nearer we approach 
'truth'." ... It was the greatest of rebaptisms; and because it has been 
adopted by Christianity we do not recognize how astonishing it is. 
Fundamentally, Plato, as the artist he was, preferred appearance to being! 
Lie and invention to truth! The unreal to the actual! He was so convinced 
of the value of appearance that he gave it the attributes 'being', 'causality', 
'goodness' and 'truth', in short everything ['moral'] men value 10  
Even the most unsympathetic reader of Plato might well be "astonished"  though hardly 
as Nietzsche would intend  at how utterly unrecognizable is any such account of what 
Plato actually wrote, said or preferred. How ever is it possible to understand Plato's intent 
as that of conferring upon the appearance the rank of absolute being, and how is the idea, 
of all things, possibly to be construed as the crucial metaphor for such a preferential 
valuation of the apparent over the real? How can such a view of the Platonic philosophy 
be other than gratuitously contentious, given that it is precisely the very opposite case 
that is pressed on every page of the dialogues? Are we to understand that Plato lied to us 
or to himself; that he meant or believed the opposite of what his arguments overtly 
contend? Does Nietzsche believe he has 'exposed' a Plato hidden not only from us but 
also from himself: an unconscious perversity concealed in his thinking of which even the 
philosopher was unaware?  
      Or is the "reversal" which Nietzsche would force upon an unwilling text simply his 
own?. Clearly the Nietzschean individual (cum 'noble Greek') will have only contempt for 
the universals of Plato; after all, 'reality' is what he wills, 'good' what he values, 'truth' a 
function of his perspective etc. From the standpoint of the absolute subject, any appeal to 
a universal must appear as the very converse of 'reality' or 'truth' in the special sense 
implied by Nietzsche's telling quotation marks.11 Indeed, the opposition and inversion to 
which Nietzsche alludes are conceivable only in terms of a much later, modern 
conception of the relation of thinking to being, clearly instanced in the Kantian scheme 
wherein everything falls within a relation between the being-in-and-for-consciousness of 
the world and its being-in-self  between 'representation' (Vorstellung) and 'thing-itself  a 
relation which, since comprehended entirely within the sphere of subjectivity, is 
decidedly un-Platonic and even un-Greek.  
      Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's teacher, takes his cue entirely from this debate, proposing 
in opposition to the equation of the real with the phenomenal, represented world  a 
position precisely articulated in Comtean positivism, for example  a radical realism of the 
in-itself, wherein the world-for-consciousness is reduced to but a moment of a self-
expressive, preconscious and pre-representational life, Wille, a reality that cannot in 
principle be represented in intellectual or moral consciousness but is encountered only 
aesthetically, in the immediacy of self-feeling. This Schopenhauerian absolute is the 
birth-parent of the Nietzschean will-to-power and grandparent to what Heidegger will 
                                                
10. WP 572 
11 Nietzsche's opens Beyond Good and Evil with this challenge to philosophy: "Suppose we want truth: 
why not rather untruth?" (BGE 1) 
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more abstractly call 'being'. From the standpoint of a radical subjective realism, 'reason', 
'thought', 'idea' and such terms acquire a specifically altered meaning; their universal 
logical and ontological sense is abandoned and their meaning restricted to mere forms 
and contents of consciousness. To advocate the rule of reason is thus to identify 
consciousness with being; to appeal to the truth of ideas is to declare the measure of the 
reality of things to lie in their representation, how they are given in consciousness.  
      It is on the basis of this thoroughly modern polarization between consciousness and 
the in-itself that Nietzsche (following Schopenhauer and prefiguring Heidegger) takes the 
extreme liberty of equating 'idea' with 'representation', then to levelling against Plato the 
charge, astonishing in its turn, that in identifying truth with the idea he betrayed a 
preference for the appearances over the real, the polar opposite of what Plato everywhere 
and persistently argues: that what the idea precisely is not, is a representation. 
Notwithstanding, Nietzsche construes the subsequent preoccupation of Western 
philosophy with the ideas as the culturally extended elaboration of the 'prejudice' of 
Plato's.12 On this account, philosophy is in principle a nihilism, a specifically world-
negative spirit contemptuous of living reality from which it withdraws into a netherworld 
of pure thinking, there to generate non-entities of its own, the representations or 'ideas', 
which then are constituted as another world transcendent to this one which is demoted to 
the status of an illusion. It is this momentous 'inversion', springing out of the corruption 
and suppression of an instinctive will-to-life by a contrary will-to-think that Nietzsche 
presents, even as early as his Birth of Tragedy, as the essential leitmotif of Western moral 
and cultural history.  
      It is in terms of this extreme and deliberately anti-rationalist account of Western 
culture that Nietzsche mounts his attack on philosophy's founding father, Plato, the first 
logocentrist: the first to 'forget' being, to detach it from its appearances and to hold fast to 
the latter by seeking to ground them in thought-constructed, logical essences. The terms 
of a 19th century debate are in this manner read back verbatim into the classical record; 
the resulting 'fit' is not only awkward or implausible, however, but does clear and vivid 
violence to both Plato's text and time. To speak of his reference to ideas as a flight from 
reality to the appearances, the latter understood as only the subjective representations of 
the former, is to speak from within a phenomenological and a distinctively post-Greek 
schema wherein 'appearance' has come to denote mere being-for-a-subject as opposed to 
subjectivity itself as the truth of being. To the extent Plato might be said to treat of an 
analogous position, it is with regard to the Sophist argument from subjective relativity 
which he challenges with relentless thoroughness on every page. But even this analogy is 
only partly apt; it is only within the context of a romanticist identification of being and 
subjectivity that it can make any sense to speak of the appearances as subjective 
representations only and of the ideas as mere fabrications designed to sustain these in 
                                                
12 This confusion of 'idea' with 'representation' has long been a fixation in English-speaking philosophy. For 
many years the best-known translation of Schopenhauer's main work (Haldane and Kemp, London, 1883) 
had its title as "World as Will and as Idea", though the German has Vorstellung, representation, not Idee. A 
newer version by E.F.J. Payne (New York, 1966) has corrects this, yet the bias persists: Rorty's Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton 1979) argues that Western philosophy, in its traditional appeal to ideas, 
is rooted in a prejudicial grounding of reality in representation, i.e., a 'reflection' of nature in mind.. 
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dissociation from their true being. Such an account seems wilfully to controvert both the 
spirit and the letter of the actual Platonic writings.  
      For if Plato can be said to make a case in favour of the appearances, it is certainly not 
to afford them a being of their own; such an identification of the apparent as the real is, if 
anything, the view Nietzsche himself will ultimately espouse (as, in another way, do the 
Sophists).13 With Plato the issue of the appearances was much more straightforward. The 
question had been passed down to him whether, with Parmenides, we must distinguish 
the being of things from their non-being absolutely, on the principle that things cannot 
both be and not be, or whether, with Heraclitus, we must afford due recognition to a 
world of becoming in which things both are and are not and in which being and non-
being are in some sense the same. Plato's whole interest was to bring these thoughts 
together: to discover in the instability and changeability of things a stable principle of 
their actuality and correspondingly to recognize, contra Parmenides, that there can be an 
understanding of the changeable which is more than mere ignorance. It is within this 
context that the relation between the appearances, phainomena, and a principle of 
actuality, idea, became important for him.  
      There is no withdrawal here into a netherworld of pure thought. Plato was no 
platonist. The interest is to show how the truth of the actual world might be brought to 
light and the abstractions of the earlier logicians and metaphysicians resolved into a more 
concrete wisdom. Nor has Plato's idea to do with representations in subjective 
consciousness for the simple reason 'the subject' had yet to be invented. Nor can it make 
sense to say that he prejudices thought against being. The idea is nothing other than the 
unity of thinking and being, concept and thing: no less the principle of the latter's 
animation  the very being-dog of the dog, the being-just of just actions  as of its 
comprehension. We find the most unambiguous summary of all this in the well-known 
figure of Republic (509d),14 where differing classes of reality are correlated with types of 
knowledge appropriate to them. There is here no notion whatever of appearances as the 
representations of things in thought; the term is applied strictly 'ontically' to things so far 
as they are mutable existences, both are and are not, are beings in time. Nor are ideas 
spoken of as mere thought-forms  a view explicitly denied in the Parmenides dialogue 
(132b-d) as elsewhere. Rather, as principles of the actuality of things, the ideas are 
known on the analogy of the way ordinary visible things are seen.15 There is no notion in 
Plato, in short, of any radical dissociation of apparent and real or of thought and being in 
the sense such distinctions acquire in modern philosophy. Plato everywhere is concerned 
                                                
13 The absence of any difference between being and appearance or being and becoming is a theme pursued 
throughout Nietzsche's philosophy. The "supreme will to power" is described as imposing the stamp of 
being upon becoming. "The closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being" is the 
metaphor of eternal recurrence (WP 617). Put pre-socratically: "The world exists; it is not something that 
becomes .. or passes away. Or rather, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased 
from passing away ... It lives on itself: its excrements are its food" (WP 1066). This thought is discussed 
approvingly by Heidegger in Nietzsche, (San Francisco, 1987, ed. D. Krell) v.III, Pt.3, ss.4. 
14 Source: Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed Hamilton/Cairns, Princeton, 1961. 
15 Republic 507d-509b: the idea is neither a thing, nor is it the mere thought; it is the principle through 
which these are related in knowledge. Plato's figure cannot be squared with any such sharp division 
between thinking and being as Nietzsche would impute to him. 
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with showing, not how thinking and being are opposed, but how they might be reconciled 
in an actual and true knowledge. Whether it can be said he achieved this aim in his theory 
of 'participation' remains of course open to question, but Nietzsche's account of stark 
oppositions of Life to Reason and an outright intent of subverting the former through a 
retreat into an intellectual and moral vacuum is simply glaringly inappropriate to the 
Platonic context. Only from a 19th century standpoint could anything of the kind be even 
imagined.  
 
3. Heidegger's Development Of The Nietzschean Theme  
(a) Heidegger's 'History' of Being.  
      Heidegger's ontology belongs to the same romanticist quest for a counter-intellectual 
absolutism that preoccupied Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, though he brings the argument 
to a higher plane of refinement. Their common presumption is the modern axiom of self-
conscious freedom, the identity of existence and thought, a principle implicit from the 
outset of philosophy but which reaches its fullest, most definitive articulation in Hegelian 
philosophy.16 This unity Heidegger and others wholly assume, but would seek to resolve 
to immediacy, thus to the primacy of its existential moment. This one-sided resolution 
sustains itself through the renunciation of the opposite notion, namely that the unity is 
generated from the side of thinking, a unity only in idea. As it is a question of the unity of 
being and thinking, however, the latter cannot simply be downplayed in favour of some 
dumb ontic absolute. The moment of self-conscious freedom must thus somehow be 
shown to 'belong to being', as Heidegger obscurely puts it; being will have to be newly 
defined as the absolute ground both of the existent and of the reflexive apprehension 
thereof.17  
      The key problematic then becomes: how is one to think that which in principle is 
before thinking; how rationally to demonstrate the grounding of the rational itself in the 
pre-rational, or consciousness in the unconscious? More generally, how is it possible to 
defend philosophically a standpoint that is on its own account pre-philosophical or 
(which is really the same) post-philosophical. Heidegger conceives this task as one of 
showing how all that appertains to thinking  to consciousness, representation, idea, 
reason, indeed thought itself  can be reconstituted as modes and distinctions within being 
as more radically understood.18 Secondly, he would show how any alternative 
understanding inevitably leads to the converse corruption of the unity of being and 
                                                
16 Heidegger recognizes this in his Introduction to Metaphysics (NY 1961, tr. Manheim, [hereinafter IM], 
p.158): "The philosophy of the Greeks conquered the Western world not in its original beginning but in the 
incipient end, which in Hegel assumed great and definitive form." 
17 Heidegger's ontology supersedes and assimilated Husserl's phenomenological standpoint just in this 
sense that consciousness, pivotal for the latter, is recast as an ontic category, turning up as Dasein, the 
"being for whom being is a question". 
18 "The differentiation springs from an initial inner union between thinking and being itself. The formula 
'being and thinking' designates a differentiation that is demanded as it were by being itself" (IM 101). 
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thought, reducing it to a mere relation within thinking: the essence, for Heidegger, of 
historical rationalism.19  
      Following Nietzsche, Heidegger will extend this otherwise wholly contemporary 
conflict to make it the theme of a vast historico-philosophical drama. An ancient Greek 
sense of the virginal harmony of thinking with being is adulterated, the victim of a 
tyrannical misapprehension which divides reason from being, divinizing the former to 
establish it as the successor to being. This then becomes the essential gospel of Western 
theology and metaphysics under whose influence over two millennia the original truth of 
being has been suppressed and all but forgotten. Plato is the first of the 'metaphysicians' 
to promote the ascendency of logos over ousia;20 the last is Hegel whose system 
completes the Platonic assimilation of being to the idea. Heidegger is quite literal in his 
commitment to this curiously melodramatic account:  
This differentiation [between 'being and thinking'] is a name for the 
fundamental attitude of the Western spirit. In accordance with this attitude, 
being is defined from the standpoint of thinking and reason... The maxim 
[that thinking and being are the same] became the guiding principle of 
Western philosophy only when it ceased to be understood because its 
original truth could not be held fast. The falling away from the truth of this 
maxim began with the Greeks themselves, immediately after Parmenides 
(IM 122).  
In the seemingly unimportant distinction between being and thinking we 
must discern the fundamental position of the Western spirit against which 
our central attack is directed. It can be overcome only by a return to its 
origins, i.e., we must place its initial truth within its own limits and so put 
it on a new foundation (IM 99).  
Heidegger thus relies directly upon a para-historical narrative of the origins of Western 
philosophy, serving as premise and prelude to his own 20th century ontology. It might 
appear, ironically, that in this a certain Hegelian reason-in-history is assumed: an 
incipient principle becomes a realized end. But Heidegger's interest was clearly never in 
the history of philosophy as such, in the treatment of which he is notoriously selective 
                                                
19 This existential interpretation of the modern principle Heidegger opposes to modern revolutionary 
humanism which, appealing to the same unity, presents it from the other side in terms of a radical freedom 
which subdues existence, thus conforming it to itself.. For Engels, the cherry tree in the garden 'exists' only 
relative to human practical interests; indeed Nature itself is but a 'resource', i.e., a disappearing moment in 
technical self-activity,. For Heidegger, it is rather being, not freedom which is primary, with individuality 
itself an inexorable 'being-there'. That this human being-there be reducible to a mere being-for technocratic 
freedom Heidegger considered a perverse and destructive fiction grounded in a gross misapprehension of 
the "truth of being" and wholly inimical to a real, existential freedom. 
20 There are any number of Heidegger's writings dealing directly or indirectly with Plato's "doctrine of 
truth", including the essay so named. But though nuance and focus change, his thesis remains virtually 
unchanged from what is argued in An Introduction to Metaphysics (IM) to which, for convenience's sake, 
all further references will apply. For a closer account of the consistency of Heidegger's view of Plato see 
R.J. Dostal, "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato", in C. Macann, ed., Martin Heidegger: Critical 
Assessments, (London, 1992). 
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and even cavalier.21 His principal interest was only in showing that, and how, Christian-
European modernity should be seen to rest on, thus originate in, an 'historical' fallacy.  
      Heidegger's call for a "deconstruction" of the Western metaphysical tradition as 
prerequisite to a 20th century reawakening to the truth of being is thus, in reality, an a-
historical, or better, an ultra-historical exercise. Nietzsche similarly offers, not a history, 
but a 'genealogy' of nihilism, that is, a purported ancestry of modern decadence. Their 
aim in common is not to review the history of philosophy as such, but to expose the 
philosophical spirit itself as symptomatic of cultural degeneracy  Nietzsche calls it a 
sickness  to which they claim to bear witness in their own time. The appeal to 
reconstructed history only serves to reinforce the main thesis, which springs from a 
wholly contemporary perception of modern culture as corrupted by a predominating 
rational-spiritual outlook, intrinsically repressive of what is presumed as the original, 
natural freedom of the existing individual. What passes as history is a romanticist fable of 
the fall from this 'authentic' freedom, the subsequent centuries of wandering in the desert, 
and the possibility of recovering it anew in an ultra-modern return to nature which would 
reunite post-history with pre-history.  
      The relation of such a standpoint to the actual history of thought is highly ambiguous. 
It addresses that tradition with the explicit intent of undermining it, since it is chiefly in 
contraposing itself with it that it defines itself. In this manner, however, it remains 
dependent on the very tradition it would undermine, assumes and negatively conserves it, 
even remains obsessively tied to it. Appeal is made to an elemental natural freedom 
spoken of as at once originary and radically new; an ancient freedom that comes once 
again to light with the flight of Minerva's owl as a philosophy-dominated European 
history draws to a close. It would transcend that history through a return to what are 
perceived as primordial, pre-European insights.22 This is the general procedure respecting 
the treatment of the history of philosophy followed by all the continental critics from 
Nietzsche to Derrida, issuing themselves thereby a powerful license to rewrite that 
presupposed history as a means of affecting a liberation from it. All have recourse to the 
Greeks, for where Philosophy begins there also must its insipient limit be found. Thus 
Heidegger:  
                                                
21 See IM 130 for Heidegger's remarkable view that history is always and essentially decline rather than 
progress. This flows necessarily from an existential standpoint for which there neither is nor can be an 
objective, historical world. If he can say "world is always the world of Spirit" (IM 37), 'world' is here meant 
in an entirely onto-psychological, i.e., existential sense. History likewise becomes for Heidegger an 
existential moment in Dasein, 'historicity', rendered in accordance with a curiously para-Hegelian view of 
temporality: "History is not synonymous with the past; for the past is precisely what is no longer happening 
... [nor with] the merely contemporary, which never happens but merely 'passes'... It is precisely the present 
that vanishes in happening" (IM 38). Hegel observed that in this ever-vanishing present, time also vanishes, 
but Heidegger will hold the line at this point. 
22 Heidegger and Nietzsche are certainly not alone in the celebration of everything primitive, primordial, 
original, natural-cultural as against what is developed, constituted, mediated and historical. The same 
remains one of the most powerful themes in contemporary culture, but it was they who had a great deal to 
do with garnering philosophical respectability for this extreme polarization in which, in Nietzsche's 
formula, spirit again becomes nature and freedom instinct. 
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We shall only master Greek philosophy as the beginning of Western 
philosophy if we also understand this beginning in the beginning of its 
end. For the ensuing period it was only this end that became the 
'beginning'. So much so that it concealed the original beginning. But this 
beginning of the end of the great beginning, the philosophy of Plato and 
Aristotle, remains great even if we totally discount the greatness of its 
Western consequences (HM 150)  
      In Heidegger's account, Plato's introduction of 'philosophy' marks the turning point 
when a profound insight into the meaning of being to which the early Greeks had 
uninhibited access is displaced by another, contrary apprehension. A rupture occurs; 
dynamics intrinsic to a 'natural' consciousness which knows itself as 'belonging to being', 
are separated from their source and given a life of their own. There is generated a 
spurious order of emasculated categories, presided over by a similarly denatured reason 
which only calculates the meaning and value of appearances in accordance with these 
intellectual categories. The provision of a discourse appropriate to the pursuit and 
defence of this spurious 'ideal' world is the import of Plato's teaching, and upon it the 
whole of European intellectual and moral culture was founded.  
      Latent in this unusual narrative, however, is a much more contemporary interest: to 
confute the reigning Kantian cum-phenomenological view, the legacy of German 
idealism, in which everything whatever, in its most extreme statement even the so-called 
thing-itself, stands in relation to consciousness. Heidegger's ontological absolutism seeks 
to be more than another critique of this idealism carried out on its terms, that is, in terms 
of relations and oppositions of consciousness. He would seek to transcend this whole 
context through a meta-ontology of existence so described as already comprehensive of 
the phenomenological relation, an ontology thus radically preemptive of the standpoint of 
subjective consciousness which forms the very basis of idealism in both its theoretical 
and practical forms.23 It is with this in mind that Heidegger attempts to rewrite the history 
of philosophy as a history of idealism so defined, tracing its flaw to an alleged fatal 
severing of the bond between existence and appearance, leading to a pseudo-ontology of 
the representations of consciousness  'appearances' in the Kantian sense  which Plato, 
apparently a Kantian before his time, was the first to articulate.  
It was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere 
appearance and thus degraded. At the same time being, as idea, was 
exalted to a suprasensory realm. A chasm ... was created between the 
merely apparent existent here below and real being somewhere on high. In 
that chasm Christianity settled down ... [turned] these refashioned 
weapons against antiquity (as paganism) and so disfigured it. Nietzsche 
was right in saying that Christianity is Platonism for the people..  
Distinct from all this, the great age of Greece was a single creative self-
assertion amid the confused, intricate struggle between the powers of 
being and appearance... For the thinking of the early Greek thinkers the 
                                                
23 Heidegger's critique of practical reason likewise traces the roots of modern morality and technocracy to 
an alleged Platonic confusion of doing with making. 
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unity and conflict of being and appearances preserved their original power 
(IM 89-90).  
Heidegger here echoes, virtually word for word, Nietzsche's apocalyptic narrative of a 
present European crisis retraceable to a cultural catastrophe occurring at the end of the 
"great age of Greece", a rupture epitomized in Plato's philosophical world-view and 
sowing the poisoned seed of modern humanism. This 'exalting' of ideas and 'degrading' of 
appearances springs from a misapprehension of a unity of physis and logos which, 
according to Heidegger, Plato's predecessors already well knew, a unity wherein nature 
comprehends reason as a difference grounded wholly in itself. This relation Plato turns 
quite on its head, inaugurating thereby a legacy of 'logo-centrism' which reaches its apex 
in the system of Hegel where ideas in thought are explicitly equated, on Heidegger's 
account, with "the reality of the real".24  
      In defending these astonishing assertions Heidegger does not, since he cannot, make 
appeal to reasoned argument, such appeal being precisely the essence of the Socratic-
Platonic vice he wishes to call into question. This presents him with a unique dilemma, 
typical of all post-philosophical critique: if the authority of speculative thought is to be in 
principle denied, then no reason can be given why 'Being' should have been sundered, 
revealing itself to later Greeks in such a paradoxically self-negative way. (Nietzsche's 
earlier formulation of this dilemma: "How is the will-not-to-will even possible?") Nor 
can there be any rational accounting for why 'Being' then withdrew behind a curtain of 
forgetfulness, waiting for two thousand years for modern Germany and Heidegger. 
Absent reasoned historico-philosophical argument, then, to what other evidence or 
authority can Heidegger appeal to authenticate this strange narrative, to define its terms, 
and convincingly describe for us the before-and-after of the crucial Platonic turn 
supposed to have given birth to Europe?  
(b) Philosophy as Etymology.  
      Heidegger's well-known recourse is to language, based on the presumption that 
reality as it is for particular times and peoples has its primary expression in linguistic 
culture, the way words are generated and commonly understood. If it is in language that 
the spirit foundational of a given people finds its first embodiment, then to discover the 
original sense of their language is to rediscover their original and defining spirit. Not 
thought, not philosophy, but the disclosure of the primitive roots of key speculative terms 
thus becomes the chief access to the way "being" appears to a particular age and culture;25 
moreover, the degree to which a culture conserves or corrupts its original language is the 
measure of its 'greatness' or 'decadence'. With Heidegger, words replace concepts as the 
official lingua franca of philosophy, semiotics becomes the pilgrim's path back to a 
forgotten wisdom, and metaphysics is pursued anew under cover of etymology.  
                                                
24 This view of the Hegelian idea as the reduction of reality to its mental representation has become a 
commonplace, even though nothing could be more alien to either the language or the logic of Hegel's 
philosophy. 
25 "Language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks being." (IM 144) 
F.L. JACKSON:  THE POST-MODERN ATTACK ON PLATO 
 
 19 
      The notion of 'original meaning' is, of course, fraught with ambiguity. Clearly related 
to other romantic notions of return to a pristine, pre-intellectual and instinctive life and 
wisdom, it prizes the aboriginal over the civilized, feeling over thought, myth over 
history and an aesthetical view of nature as opposed to science's meddling intellect.26 It is 
no startling revelation of contemporary hermeneutics to observe, however, that a fatal 
circularity plagues any attempt to identify such a thing as an 'original' meaning; the 
search for a linguistic source of the Nile is bound to degenerate, as the romanticist 
mentality itself, into a sort of unrequited longing. For one thing, only a divine 
etymologist could avoid introducing into any such research much that belongs to her own 
derivative linguistic context. More important for philosophy, when substituted for 
reasoned argument the etymological method provides its practitioners with unlimited 
license, a license bound to be abused, to introduce and promote all manner of 
assumptions and convictions by the linguistic back door. Plato himself deals specifically 
with these issues in the Cratylus;  
      This is certainly the case with Heidegger who sets many such traps for his readers. In 
accepting his version of the sense of certain Greek terms, one unwittingly commits to an 
ultra-modernist account of the world put into the mouths of ancient thinker-heroes who 
are assigned various roles, as in a Verdi opera, in a contrived metaphysical melodrama. 
How plausible, really, are Heidegger's etymological exercises? How much is Greek 
original insight and how much late German ontology? It is not easy to know, and it is a 
question whether all the classical scholarship in the world could ever tell us, for reasons 
which Plato, again, spells out clearly in Cratylus. But aside from all learned appeals to 
philology, it is instructive simply to compare Heidegger's overt account of the meaning of 
certain key Greek terms with the account Plato himself gives of the same, sticking strictly 
to the philosophical import of any difference.  
      Heidegger's typical tactic is to inform us, without much ado, as to how the Greeks of 
the golden age purportedly understood certain words. This he contrasts with later, post-
Socratic uses, reading into any divergence, not just the common variability witnessed in 
all growing languages, but the weightiest metaphysical implications such as tax the most 
generous credulity. His basic thesis is familiar: the ordinary Greek view of being, he says, 
is expressed in the word physis ('nature'), whose meaning he variously gives as the 
appearing, manifest presence or standing-forth of the existent as such and on the whole. 
Moreover, he says, the Greeks "called the appearance of a thing eidos or idea", a term 
which, since it suggests a visual context, implies the "coming to light of the existent."27 
                                                
26 See IM 84. Romanticism has its philosophical form in 19th century metaphysical expressionism for 
which all that occurs in nature, history or experience is construed as utterly 'phenomenal' in the distinct 
sense of being but the outward self-manifestation of an Absolute that remains in itself hidden; whose 
'reasons' are therefore entirely inscrutable or encountered only aesthetically, mystically or in feeling. 
Heidegger is fully in this tradition. See my "The Beginning of the End of Metaphysics", Dionysius v.15, 
pp.113-123. 
27 Here again Heidegger assumes an equivalence of idea and representation with Plato, discordant with 
Plato's own view which always equates the idea with the principle of a thing, never its 'representation', 
which latter term in any case belongs to another era. The alleged degenerate meaning of idea attributed to 
Plato is a fiction of Heidegger's construction, as is the whole idea of an original identification of logos with 
physis among the ancients. 
F.L. JACKSON:  THE POST-MODERN ATTACK ON PLATO 
 
 20 
Here Heidegger has already afforded being precedence over thought: the existent is first, 
and the significance of eidos shifted bodily, and un-Platonically, to suggest the being-
seen of the existent rather than what belongs to the act of seeing. Furthermore, granting a 
certain ambiguity inheres in the concept of appearance which allows distinction to be 
made between the appearing of being ("unconcealment") of what appears and that 
appearance as such (as what has "come on the scene"), Heidegger will insist the 
difference is no difference, that appearance "belongs" wholly to being, that being is the 
"essence" of the appearance, that being and appearing are thus the same, and that this 
indeed is how pre-Socratic Greeks understood the term idea: as the apprehension of the 
apparent as grounded in physis and one with it.  
      It amounts to the same to say that 'being' really is nothing else but what appears; that 
what appears is the thing itself, that the distinction between reality and appearance is no 
distinction. Nietzsche everywhere makes this point and it has Heidegger's express 
approval. "Appearing is not something subsequent that sometimes happens to being," he 
writes, "appearing is the very essence of being" (IM 83ff; also 92,93). He grants one may 
differentiate between the appearing of being as such and appearances  existing things and 
events  as such. But he insists that the existent entails nothing else beyond being itself; 
that it is being's very own unconcealment, its "coming upon the scene". Thus the 
distinction 'being-appearance' itself belongs entirely to being.  
      It is striking how exactly this very stressed view of the matter accords with the 
general tenets of modern romanticist ontology. In Heidegger's narrative, Plato really 
meant to use the idea-word as any Greek would to refer to the way being appears, but he 
fell into the error of viewing the matter from his own human standpoint which had the 
effect of driving a wedge between things and appearances, between physis and eidos, 
whereby the former becomes "degraded" and the latter "exalted". So detached from what 
it is that appears, the appearances achieve a seeming reality of their own; by falsely 
construing eidos as the "essence of the existent" the latter is afforded a prominence 
sustained only by abstract thought. In such a scheme even 'being' becomes a mere 
universal, an empty word, and nature or physis a problematical reality subordinated to the 
new 'ideal world' of ideas.  
What does it mean that physis should have been interpreted as idea in 
Plato?... The word idea means that which is seen in the visible, the aspect 
it offers. What is offered is the appearance, eidos, of what confronts us. 
The appearance of a thing is that wherein, as we say, it presents, 
introduces itself to us, places itself before us ... i.e., in the Greek sense is.  
A consequence is exalted to the level of the essence itself and takes the 
place of the essence... We then have a falling-off, which must in turn 
produced strange consequences. The crux of the matter is not that physis 
should have been characterized as idea but that the idea should have 
become the sole and decisive interpretation of being (IM 151-2).  
      With Plato nature is no longer the ground of appearance, rather the appearance (for 
Heidegger = the idea) has become the basis for the interpretation of nature. But all this 
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has an extreme and quite unfamiliar ring. How can Plato be thought to have had any such 
inversion of things in mind? How far does the significance Heidegger assigns to Platonic 
terminology actually accord with what is expressly to be found in Plato's own writings? 
Could Heidegger be guilty of thrusting 20th century paradigms inappropriately upon an 
ancient text and context? The everyday reader of the dialogues will certainly be 
astonished to learn that Plato was not at all interested in the truth of being but only in the 
appearances; that he introduced the idea only as a device for rendering the latter absolute, 
referring them, not to their proper ground, but to their own abstract nature. No such 
account of things can be found in Plato's own express arguments, nor could it explain his 
tireless war against the Sophists whose arguments he saw as predicated precisely on some 
such Parmenidean dissociation of real and apparent, reconciled only by a Protagorean 
reduction of being to its mere apprehension. On Heidegger's account it turns out that 
Plato is supreme among Sophists, carrying their argument to its extreme by extending the 
relativism of Gorgias, for whom being can neither be known nor said, into a more radical 
idealism where being is expressly identified with its representation. Heidegger would 
appear to have turned Plato's thought into a parody on German idealism, a caricature of a 
caricature.  
      Heidegger performs the same etymological rearguard action with respect to two 
related issues where Plato is again implicated as the perverter of an original Greek 
understanding. First Heidegger charges Plato and Aristotle with corrupting the original 
Heraclitean sense of logos, whereby it becomes the foundation of 'logic', a purely 
epistemic technique addressed to the calculation of relations among representations.28 
Second, he accuses Plato of perpetrating a fatal misunderstanding of the famous 
Parmenidean aphorism on the sameness of thinking and being, an original Greek insight, 
in Heidegger's view, which now at last needs to be rescued from the Platonic distortion.  
We go back to the two decisive thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus, and 
attempt once more to gain admittance into the Greek world, whose 
foundations, even though distorted and transposed, covered and concealed, 
still sustain our world. Precisely because we have embarked on the great 
venture of demolishing a world that has grown old and of rebuilding it 
authentically anew ... we must know the tradition.29  
Of all the early Greek thinkers it is Heraclitus who, in the course of 
Western philosophy, has suffered the most transformation along un-Greek 
lines... Christianity was responsible for the misinterpretation of Heraclitus. 
It was begun by the Old Church Fathers. Hegel was still in this 
tradition...(IM 106-7)  
      According to Heidegger's reconstruction, the original sense of logos is 'to gather 
together, to collect'. Such a use can certainly be verified by reference to any college 
                                                
28 "[Logic] began when Greek philosophy was drawing to an end and becoming an affair of schools, 
organization, and technique. It began when eon, the being of the essent, was represented as idea and as such 
became the 'object' of episteme." (IM 102) 
29 Italics added. The statement epitomizes the romanticist project. Derrida has given a similarly negative 
rationale for continuing the study of the tradition  to become free of it. 
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lexicon, but Heidegger according to his typical regressive method deliberately downplays 
more developed meanings such as 'reasoned account'  meanings which in fact fit far more 
readily into the flow of the Heraclitean argument  to look for more 'original' senses which 
better accord with his own intent. The alternative 'gathering'30 better suits Heidegger's 
purpose since it allows him to cite the 'original' sense of logos as the "the intrinsic 
togetherness of the existing thing", even though no lexicon could possibly support any 
such complex extension. But Heidegger is driven by the wish to maintain that logos and 
physis are the same; that logos is just being itself in its aspect of an all-pervasive power 
binding together a multifarious phenomenality.(IM 109-110) But to conscript Heraclitus 
in defence of such an improbable rendering is overtly to ignore what he himself actually 
says, which is not that everyday things and events are "disparate and antagonistic" yet 
unified through their "intrinsic togetherness" in being, as Heidegger puts it, but that they 
are utterly and intrinsically unstable, self-divided, their being just as much a non-being 
and vice versa. What alone remains stable is the logos itself, specifically defined as the 
immanent identity of opposites, most tellingly the opposition of being and non-being 
which everywhere rules in the finite world.  
      This hardly accords with Heidegger's account; nonetheless it is Plato once more who 
is accused of misunderstanding Heraclitus, of distorting his alleged pristine encounter 
with logos as the togetherness that belongs to physis, setting it over against being as 
something independent. Yet in any discussion one might care to mention, Plato never 
(mis)represents Heraclitus in any such way; on the contrary, he shares with his 
contemporaries the plainer understanding of the logos as a stable principle of the unity-
of-opposites immanent in an otherwise meaningless welter of the changeable. The logos 
is never represented as something apart from or beyond the way things appear, but as 
their own inward and animating principle.  
      To describe the logos merely as the "togetherness" of beings in being is to say 
something far more banal than Heraclitus, by his own account, clearly intended. Does this 
dilution of his powerful principle represent Heidegger's best effort to enlist him in 
support of his own radically onto-centric interpretation of pre-Platonic Greek thought? Is 
it not rather Heidegger who corrupts the Heraclitean argument in support of his own 
expressionist view of the immediate relation of the absolute to the finite with the logos 
signifying nothing more  nothing higher or deeper  than the mere togetherness of one in 
the other? So to place the logos at the level of appearances as expressing (all too vaguely) 
a certain togetherness implied by a common groundedness in what it is that appears; then 
to present this account as an 'original' Greek understanding in relation to which all other 
interpretations, including Plato's, are to be rejected as un-Greek; such an account, if 
plausible at all, is at least nowhere to be verified in anything Heraclitus is known to have 
said.  
      Heidegger pursues a similar stratagem with regard to the famous "word" of 
Parmenides which he claims has been subject to "a misinterpretation no less un-Greek 
than the falsification of the Heraclitean doctrine of the logos."(HM 115) The relevant 
                                                
30 He also avoids the obvious implication that 'to grasp or gather together' might equally be well rendered 
by the all-too-logical term 'con-cept'. 
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fragments seem straightforward enough: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai (frag. 5) and 
tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema (frag. 8). The first is typically rendered by 
something like 'thinking and being are the same', the second as 'thinking and what is for 
thought are the same', both broadly suggesting the principle that 'thinking is always and 
only of what is', or negatively, 'what is not is unthinkable'. This is consistent with what 
Parmenides and his disciplines such as Zeno directly argue. The reading Heidegger 
comes up with, however, is mediated by a host of strained and elaborate etymological 
interpretations. For example, regarding noein, a word routinely translated in most 
languages as 'thinking' or some variant, Heidegger chooses to translate it as 
'apprehension' (Vernehmen). If 'thinking' has a distinctly active connotation, 
'apprehension' suggests passive awareness, as of something already given and merely 
borne witness to. Here again, by an exercise in etymological legerdemain, the matter has 
already been biased in favour of a view of thinking as a moment in being, as 'belonging 
to' it. Heidegger further explains in the following neologistic definition: "Apprehension 
(noien) is the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests 
itself."(IM 117)  
      Regarding einai, Heidegger is again concerned that we first understand 'being' in his 
way, which he has decided is also the way the Greeks of the great age understood it: 
namely as unconcealment, the manifesting of the unmanifest. Finally the phrase to auto ... 
te kai, is not to be understood in the conventional sense of 'the same as', but as 'belonging 
to', this more oblique translation allowing Heidegger to avoid any suggestion of identity 
of thinking and being and to say no more than that they somehow 'belong together'. The 
end result of all these labourious lexical machinations is that it can now be declared on 
behalf of Parmenides that noein, while distinguishable within physis, is not different than 
it; that thinking is in no way autonomous but belongs to being; it is being itself that calls 
apprehension into play.31 Given these etymological premises, Heidegger can provide his 
own final, if staggeringly convoluted, translation of Frag. 5: "Where being prevails, 
apprehension prevails and happens with it; the two belong together" or again, more 
abstrusely, "Being dominates, but because and insofar as it dominates and appears, 
appearing and with it apprehension must also occur." Frag. 8 gets similar treatment: "The 
same is apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs" or "There is an 
inherent bond between apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs." 
(IM 117)  
      Such cumbersome transpositions of simple Greek statements into 20th century 
expressionist jargon do great violence to the simple wisdom of the Parmenidean 
principle. Could Parmenides ever have thought any such thing? It is clear that Plato, at 
least, understood this principle in its literal, unadulterated sense: being alone is 
conceivable; of what is not, of non-being there can only be ignorance. But his was 
nonetheless far from an unqualified acceptance of Parmenides' proviso: there is another, 
ambiguous world of things that both are and are not, a knowledge of which the abstract 
Parmenidean identity of being and thinking will not allow. Contrary to his traditional 
                                                
31 Heidegger's well-known essay Was heisst Denken? tortures the ordinary German way of asking the a 
question like "What is 'x'?" (or, What do we mean by 'x'?), until he finally forces the expression to read: 
"what is it that calls forth thinking?". 
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caricature, which Heidegger further reinforces, Plato was always and ever concerned with 
how there could be a concrete knowledge of the finite and changeable world, the world of 
'appearances'; with how the One might be known in the Many and the Many as 
participating the One.32 In this he parts company with both Heraclitus and Parmenides; in 
the Parmenides dialogue, Zeno's celebrated deconstruction of any knowledge deriving 
from the finite, showing it to fall inevitably into contradictions, is matched by an equally 
cogent demonstration by Socrates showing how a knowledge commencing from the strict 
standpoint of the Parmenidean disjunction leads also to many absurdities. At no point 
does Plato suggest a solution to lie in any dissociation of thinking from being, the source 
of unity to lie subjectively in the knower's representations. In Parmenides that solution is 
clearly and explicitly repudiated. (Parmenides 132b)  
      The idea is Plato's deeper rendering of the unity of thinking and being. It is uniformly 
spoken of as the objective principle of beings the comprehension of which constitutes a 
true knowledge of them. The idea is neither thing nor thought but being and essence at 
once; though itself neither plant nor eye, the sun is both the source of the living thing and 
the light that makes the sight of it possible(Repub. 580). There is never any suggestion in 
Plato that ideas belong to the realm of appearances, as no more than the latter's abstract 
representation, as Heidegger and Nietzsche perversely construe his position. Nothing, 
indeed, could be more at odds with what Plato consistently maintains; the idea is never 
associated with how things appear to us  that he clearly defines as a Sophist position. Nor 
does he locate them in a sort of Pythagorean thought-world away and beyond what is 
immediately evident. Even if Aristotle thought he never adequately answered it, for Plato 
the question of the ideas had nothing to do with how a changeful world might be 
bypassed en route to some metaphysical heaven, nor with rendering the appearances as 
such absolute, as on Heidegger's account, by fixing them in their abstract essences. It had 
to do with whether and how the actual, mutable world might be somewhat comprehended 
if only its own immanent intelligible principles could be discerned.  
      In his criticism of Plato, Heidegger places an inordinate burden on the interpretation 
of ancient Greek terms and texts. There is already an extensive scholarly literature 
dealing with the legitimacy or otherwise of his strained transliterations which 
characteristically tend to revert to peripheral or pre-philosophical usages with which to 
confront their later philosophical sense. Applied generally, such a method would reduce 
most developed terms to perplexing banality: a cause would be a confession of guilt, to 
make lace to fashion a noose, a lady is a bread-maker and so on. Not only that, but where 
only the 'original' sense of words is considered meaningful, effective translation from one 
tongue to another tongue would be rendered virtually impossible, which Heidegger and 
his followers are often tempted to argue anyway.33  
                                                
32 See James Doull on these matters, to appear in this number of Animus. 
33 Heidegger makes much of the superiority of Greek and German languages as alone capable of expressing 
spiritual truth. ( IM 47) Where there is no appeal beyond language to thought the result is linguistic 
fascism, instantiated in the Heideggerean argument that, while German-speakers intuitively can appreciate 
the Greek sense of ousia, English-speakers cannot, hearing only techne. 
F.L. JACKSON:  THE POST-MODERN ATTACK ON PLATO 
 
 25 
      Plato presses many ordinary words into service as philosophical concepts which 
acquire thereby another and distinctive sense that may or may not accord with simpler or 
more common usages. The same is true of most words one can think of:  is a soul 
(pneuma), for example, really no more than a breath? The prima facie instance is 
Heidegger's treatment of eidos and idea which in common ancient usage did indeed 
connote the way something is seen, how it looks. It is clear on every page of his writings, 
however, that Plato did not intend eidos or idea to be understood in any such 
commonplace way but that he had deliberately altered and upgraded the term for an 
original and sophisticated philosophical use. Yet Heidegger, on the basis of nothing more 
than an appeal to a literal, everyday use of these words, accuses him of dire metaphysical 
mischief, specifically of confusing the being of things with their mere representation in 
thought, even though there is hardly a page where Plato does not argue exactly the 
converse. Heidegger turns language into a prison-house; he denies to Plato a freedom 
expressively to mould language which he himself profusely indulges. When we, on the 
other hand, read that language is the "house of being" in which "man dwells" we do not 
ask Heidegger if reference is being made to some inn in the Schwarzwald into which one 
might move bag and baggage.  
 
4. Plato's Response: Language As Prison-House  
      Without joining these etymological wars, it is instructive to ask what Plato himself 
would think of Heidegger's method. Something of a fair answer is available in the 
Cratylus, a dialogue which specifically addresses the limits of etymology as a means of 
deciding philosophical matters. There Plato considers the two principal alternatives 
regarding the origin of linguistic meaning which still confound semiotic theory today: is 
the attachment of particular meanings to particular words purely arbitrary, conventional 
in the radical sense of a pure matter of chance? Or must we suppose that linguistic 
conventions are for the most part derivative and their meaning disclosed only by referring 
back to original meaning  the faith of the etymologist? In the dialogue the contradiction 
stemming immediately from the first option is quickly recognized and agreed upon  strict 
conventionalism would mean anything anyone says will be 'true'; it would be impossible 
to judge of a right or a wrong use of words. The remainder of the argument then focuses 
on the second hypothesis, the possibility that linguistic conventions can be traced back to 
some original source of meaning, that is, to some sort of authentic bond between 
language and reality, word and thing.  
      How is such an original bond between language and being to be imagined? One 
typical image is that of a primeval people gifted with immediate and immaculate insight 
into their own reality and condition, a reality directly embodied and expressed in their 
language and culture. In such an 'original' condition, merely to speak at all is to speak the 
truth, and this provides a standard against which the sense of derivative languages can be 
measured. To such an image Heidegger appeals when he looks to the linguistic usages of 
the "Greeks of the great age" as the prime standard of metaphysical meaning.  
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      In the Cratylus Socrates and his interlocutors make use of a similar metaphor by 
imagining an ancient "legislator" or "giver of names" whose business was appropriately 
to discover and assign words to things. This figure is no less legitimate than Heidegger's 
fiction of a pristine linguistic culture whose authority he demands we simply accept. But 
it does more obviously beg the question as to what reasons a name-giver might adduce to 
justify his choosing just this sound or squiggle over some other as most appropriate to 
naming a particular entity or event. The search for linguistic originality is in this way 
driven back to the vain attempt to find a direct link between verbal structures and the 
natural events and sensations they are employed to signify.  
      Plato points to a number of glaring pitfalls to which the etymological search for an 
original, unadulterated vocabulary is in principle prone. Can it literally expect to arrive at 
its goal, or is the search by nature an endless one? If the former, then it is a matter of 
some amazement why this original language was ever given up, why so hopelessly 
masked by derivatives as to be rendered virtually indiscernible, or why indeed there could 
have ever been any other language but this original one. But if the latter is true and the 
etymological road is open-ended, then how, without the standard of the original sense 
being known, can that of any derivative term be determined? As Plato puts it:  
... any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance 
of secondary words, for they can only be explained by the primary. 
Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid 
explanation of first names or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense 
about the rest.34  
      A further problem: if meaning is inevitably imprisoned in language and as 
etymologists we are working from within our own derivative culture and language, how 
could we hope to recognize an underived meaning even if we encountered one? Unless 
we could leap out of our own cultural-linguistic skins, any such determination will be 
bound to be prejudiced, colored by the linguistic perspective from which it is carried out. 
For instance, how could a 20th century German academic, however well educated in the 
classics, mediaeval philosophy and Schopenhauer, be so confident of his reading of 
certain ancient Greek terms as to declare they give evidence of an aboriginal and 
authentic encounter with the very truth of being?  
      Even if one assumes the legitimacy of etymological inquiry in general, there is still a 
host of practical obstacles to frustrate the search for the original sources of particular 
words. Plato provides some examples:  
... the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages 
[and] names so twisted in all manner of ways that I should not be surprised 
if the older language when compared with that now in use would appear to 
us to be a barbarous tongue (CR 421d).  
                                                
34 Cratylus 426a,ff. (hereafter CR) 
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Moreover, there is no way we can know whether, how, why or by whom particular words 
may have been significantly altered along the way, and for reasons extraneous to what 
they are meant to signify:  
... you know that the original names have been long ago buried and 
disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of 
euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways; and time 
too may have had a share in the change (CR 414c).  
      Much of the Cratylus is devoted to exhibiting the utter arbitrariness with which the 
words and their meanings change and develop.35 Socrates and his friends nonetheless try 
their hand at a few etymological conjectures, for example, as to why the ancients named 
their gods and virtues as they did. The tone is throughout tongue-in-cheek for Plato is all 
too aware of the limits of such inquiry. He does acknowledge that some terms do have a 
'natural' origin in the limited sense that words originally designating natural phenomena 
are often borrowed and modified to express more sophisticated notions. That the word for 
'runners', theous, came into use as a general name for the gods, for example, may derive 
from the fact that the earliest divinities were associated with the celestial bodies, ever on 
the move (CR 397d). Similarly, it is noted anthropos actually suggests an animal, though 
one who looks up and reflects on what he sees; and psyche borrows on the breath that 
sustains the body to suggest the power which sustains nature itself (CR399c-e). This 
familiar feature of the ordinary development of language, which Plato accepts, where 
natural images and analogies are exploited to generate terms with a more complex and 
abstract meaning, stands in contrast with Heidegger's deconstructive use of etymology, 
employed to force the reverse assimilation of a developed meaning to an undeveloped 
one, as a means of getting at the former's 'real truth'. Such is his claim that because 
psyche has etymological roots in physis  a claim Plato explicitly rejects  we are to 
conclude that spirit belongs to nature, which of course is to destroy the whole sense of the 
term; or because eidos has the common meaning in Greek of something seen that Plato is 
to be denied the luxury of adopting the term to express a purely intellectual intuition.  
      In the Cratylus Plato includes in his ironic survey some of the philosophical terms 
that are the subject of Heidegger's earnest pronouncements. This is interesting since it is 
fair to assume that Plato, uncluttered by two millennia of speculative metaphysics and 
actually living and breathing the linguistic tradition in question, might certainly be as 
reliable an etymological witness as Heidegger. A key example: Heidegger's ontological 
absolutism requires the conversion of all cognitive relations into modalities of being. It is 
thus especially important for him to claim that even the word 'truth' initially had an ontic 
sense. To this end he gives the original meaning of the ordinary Greek term for truth, 
aletheia, as 'unconcealedness', based on an analysis of this word into the elements a- 
(not) and lethe (forgetfulness, oblivion). Truth is thus being as a "standing out from 
oblivion". Plato has an entirely different take on the word, however; his analysis yields 
                                                
35 The Cratylus is often described as indulging overmuch in aimless, even frivolous conjecturing about the 
origins of words. But it is surely Plato's point to demonstrate the indeterminability that is bound to attach to 
any attempt to 'explain' language in terms of itself, as Derrida, which is to say un-philosophically, without 
reference to thought. 
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instead ale and theia, thus something like "the divine movement of existence"(CR 421b). 
On this account the truth of being lies in the divine element latent in it, its intelligible 
moment, its 'idea'.  
      Some further contrasts: Plato tells us that legein originally suggests questioning; 
possibly also the art of speechifying and dissembling. The term logos accordingly comes 
later to mean making a case, giving reasons or grounds, and with Heraclitus is used still 
more specifically to signify a universal principle of a unity-in-opposition underlying the 
manifest impermanence of the finite. Heidegger however, as earlier noted, insists on 
reverting to a more prosaic form of the same stem, 'gather together'. By so restricting its 
meaning he is enabled to insist that in its 'original' sense logos refers to an aspect of being 
 Being as the 'togetherness' of beings  a suggestion nowhere to be found in Heraclitus and 
which indeed contradicts how he does actually speak of the matter. By completely 
ignoring the overt argument of the fragments and their explicit reference to the term logos 
to suggest an immanent reason or cause, Heidegger would seek to enlist Heraclitus on 
behalf of his own attack on the Platonic philosophy.  
      One last contrast: as also noted earlier, Heidegger insists on translating noein as 
Vernehmen, 'apprehension' or 'bearing witness', his interest again being to make thought 
over into a modality of being. So to limit thinking to passive apprehension preempts any 
notion of thought as spontaneous or constitutive; just as describing being as 'self-
presenting' precludes any notion of thinking as an active 'representation', which 
Heidegger regards as a corruption. Yet Plato's analysis of the same word yields an 
entirely different thought. Noein is broken down into neou and esis: 'desire of the new', 
implying a "world always in process of creation" toward which "the giver of the name 
wanted to express his longing of the soul...", an analysis far more consistent with other 
typical constructions.36  
      Apart from the striking differences with respect to the roots of specific terms it is 
clear Plato had far less faith than did Heidegger in the fruitfulness of etymological 
method, on which point he makes a number of telling comments. For one thing, as with 
analysis generally, there is the difficulty of ever bringing the process to completion:  
... if a person goes on analyzing names into words, and inquiring also into 
the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always 
repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the 
inquiry in despair (CR 421e).  
Further, there is a danger in supposing any so-called root meaning to be any more 
authentic or enlightened than its derivative:  
                                                
36 For instance Socrates speculates that the name 'Athena' might stem from a combination of theou and 
noesis, thus 'divine mind', or from ethei and noesin, thus 'moral intelligence'. (407b) It would be impossible 
to make sense of this or many other constructions from noein (the closing words of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
for example) using Heidegger's 'apprehension'.. 
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He who follows names in the search after things, and analyzes their 
meaning, is in great danger of being deceived ... [for] clearly he who first 
gave names gave them according to his own conception of things ... and if 
his conception was erroneous .. in what position shall we who are his 
followers find ourselves? (436a-b).  
There is thus a dogmatic quality to any claim that a word as used in an earlier time, 
among the Greeks of the great age for example, expressed the truth of things more 
authentically than does our use of it. We have reason to be wary of those who speak of 
'original meanings', especially of philosophical terms.  
      Finally, the search for a primitive bond between language and reality inevitably tends 
to some version of psycho-semiotics (in our time, 'analytic philosophy') based on the 
doctrine that language imitates nature, that words denote facts and ultimately that letters, 
syllables and words mirror sensory phenomena.37  
That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find 
expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided 
(CR 425d).  
To follow this path is to become inevitably entangled in onomatopoeic speculations as to 
how various things and occurrences are appropriately expressed in verbal clicks, grunts, 
swooshes, whines and glottal stops, a procedure Plato mercilessly lampoons. But the very 
idea of a direct, causal relation between words and sensory experience begs a great 
number of questions, among them: why, if literally rooted in a universal experience of 
nature, would not all languages be the same? Why would such a first-order form be 
abandoned and languages become so various and complex? Could what derives from a 
strict imitation of the sensory provide a linguistic resource sufficient to cover the whole 
breadth and depth of human experience? (CR 434.ff) Clearly, attempts to disclose any 
such direct and literal causal relation between words and world go nowhere; they must be 
motivated by something more than themselves.  
      What could it be, Plato finally asks, that makes the idea of archetypical meaning, a 
direct relation of language to reality, so powerful and attractive? He offers an answer: we 
are rightly convinced that when we know the word we somehow also know the thing. But 
it is illegitimate to conclude that words literally imitate reality, express it bodily, or 
"house" it. For inevitably, when we attempt to find our way back to some such original 
bond between word and thing we are led down one garden path after another:  
[in this] battle of names, some asserting that they are like the truth, others 
contending that they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide 
between them? ... Obviously recourse must be had to another standard 
                                                
37 Wittgenstein's proposal that words are "pictures" of facts now seems astonishing in its sheer literalism, 
but it electrified a whole generation which produced mountains of now largely useless research dedicated to 
discovering what "is" or "of" are pictures of, or how Russell's "cat on the mat" exactly corresponds with an 
actual cat actually on an actual mat. 
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which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two is 
right, and this must be standard which shows the truth of things (CR 
438d).  
      The real question then is what this "other standard" might be: what is it that names 
name; to what do words, however arbitrary or conventional their composition and origin, 
actually refer? The answer for Plato cannot be found by looking for their 'ontic' 
meanings, i.e., how being is domiciled in them. What words capture and express is not 
the being of the existent in its immediacy, but rather the principle of the existent, the 
logos, and it is with this in view that the representative imagination fashions words, 
creatively borrowing for the purpose whatever images and suggestions experience and 
imagination might offer. The "nobler and clearer" approach, Plato says, is that we learn 
the truth of things from themselves, irrespective of the contingency and relativity of 
linguistic figures, and this means nothing else but getting hold of their concept, their idea:  
Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through 
the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the 
things themselves. Which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way  to 
learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is 
the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth 
whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed? ... How 
real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and 
me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be 
derived from names. No, they must be studied and investigated in 
themselves (CR 439a).  
Here Plato directly confutes Heidegger's charge that his 'doctrine of truth' has only to do 
with the ordering of representations or the correctness of their correspondence with 
things. He directly declares the measure of truth to be, not whether the relation of image 
to truth is "rightly conceived", but the truth of the thing itself, the idea, which goes 
beyond the mere 'fit' of language to being.  
      Indeed, it is evident, at times embarrassingly so, that it is Heidegger who indulges in 
much linguistic gerrymandering in defence of positions that are very much his own and 
very questionably 'Greek'. That 'world' is 'unconcealment', the revelation of being 
otherwise concealed; that being is at once absolute and yet radically temporal, that logos 
'belongs to' physis, that in this sense spirit reverts to nature, thinking to being and so on: 
these are not Greek propositions but those of a modern romanticist ontology of which 
Parmenides or Plato could have made little sense. They belong to a post-modern reaction 
to the Hegelian doctrine of spirit, of self-conscious freedom, which they both presume 
and yet seek to restate in more earthy, existential terms. This Heidegger thinks to achieve 
by constructing an inverted history of the Western philosophical tradition, construed (and 
certainly misconstrued) as promoting an otherworldly freedom radically inimical to the 
concept of freedom as concrete, aboriginal and prehistorical, the pristine paradigm of 
which he imagines he has unearthed in his philosophical archaeology of early Greek 
fragments. It is for Dasein, the being for whom being itself is a question, he declares, to 
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recover the ancient encounter with being the pre-Platonic Greeks enjoyed, so that 
Western thinking, which is only a thinking of thinking, can become again a thinking 
beginning and ending with being itself in its manifest temporality as "that for the sake of 
which thinking occurs."  
      To say Plato in the Cratylus counters this Heideggerean vision point for point would 
of course go too far. Trans-historical arguments generally tend to distort things, and the 
more ambitious post-modern attempt to rewrite the whole history of philosophy from a 
standpoint purporting to be liberated from it is even more disfiguring. But at least two 
points are clear: first, there is no evidence in Plato's own writings that he committed the 
crimes of which he stands accused, of deliberately mistaking and corrupting ancient 
Greek doctrines, of sundering thinking from being and of confusing the apparent with the 
real. On their own face, his actual arguments lead to quite other conclusions. Second, 
there is overwhelming evidence that Plato was anything but naive concerning the relation 
between language, truth and being; his dialogues extensively address this very issue. But 
he is far less optimistic than Heidegger as to the virtue of hermeneutics as a means to 
philosophical insight, and he is inclined to view language as as much a prison-house as a 
dwelling house of the truth of being. His arguments in this connection are far too clear, 
too open and plain to support the belief he only advanced them to promote some 
impossible retreat from reality or to advance some unimaginable desire to corrupt an 
extant intuition into the very truth of things on the part of his predecessors.  
 
5. Conclusion - A Postscript On Derrida  
      The post-philosophical attack on Plato's legacy relies principally on the doctrine, now 
virtually a universal belief, that thought is really no more than language and philosophical 
discourse no more than a certain type of language-use. Heidegger's generation would 
insist philosophy turn to semiotics as a means of resolving ontological and other issues. 
Derrida would go even further toward a strict identification of philosophy with language. 
"Philosophy is first and foremost writing", he declares, though a peculiar kind of writing 
whose effect is to isolate the signified from its sensory verbal signifier, thereby to 
generate an illusory realm of meaning independent of language, the so-called world of 
spirit, thought and ideas. On this hyper-linguistic account, thought does not create and 
enlighten language; it is language that incorporates and generates thought.38 Accordingly, 
words have their meaning only within the endlessly inter-referential context of some 
linguistic system or text, referring to nothing whatever beyond that  even the house of 
Heidegger is a hall of mirrors. As thus never transcending writing, meaning is always, as 
such and intrinsically "undecideable".  
      According to Derrida, philosophy is a kind of writing that seeks to arrest this absolute 
ambiguity of meanings by sorting them artificially into oppositions (spirit-nature, 
intelligible-sensible, concept-intuition and so on), then affirming one to the exclusion of 
the other (surely itself a banal and artificial account of what philosophy has been about). 
                                                
38 See his essay on "Différence" in Margins of Philosophy (tr. Bass, Chicago, 1982) , p. 6ff. 
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As it is in the present tense of speech that it seems somewhat possible to fix meanings in 
the sheer verbal affirmation of them, philosophy, according to Derrida's odd thesis, 
favours speech and is intrinsically hostile to writing. Again it is Plato who is credited 
with embarking (in Phaedrus)39 upon a diatribe against writing, of initiating the practice 
of deliberately transgressing the limits of written language, of extracting meanings from 
words and setting them up on their own as a separate realm of ideas; in short, Plato 
invented 'thought'. Through a deconstruction of traditional texts, showing how in every 
case and in spite of themselves they inevitably run afoul of some ambiguity in their own 
linguistic constructions, we can at last hope to liberate ourselves from the lure of 
philosophical writing.  
      Certainly, literally to restrict meaning to language is to render the latter soulless; 
nothing is left but words themselves in their thought-less indeterminacy, dead lexical 
husks ruled only by "différence" and incapable of supporting any stable apprehension. 
Derrida's method relies chiefly on the endless opportunities for deconstructive plays on 
words which such a literal identification of meaning with linguistic entities allows. Plato, 
however, had a familiar name for it  Sophism  and his dialogues are indeed largely 
devoted to its critique. It is a piece of supreme irony that the super-sophistry of 20th 
century hermeneutics should now pretend dismissively to interpret these famous writings 
as subject to the very limits they were meant to break through. For the great aim of the 
Platonic philosophy was surely nothing else but the subduing of this linguistic Medusa, 
the breaking free from the despotism of words and their endless Protean mutations: from 
"différence". The advent of Philosophy was coincident with the triumph of nous over 
language wherein the latter is rendered thoroughly fluid and ideational, 'ideal' in Hegel's 
sense that it no longer poses an obstacle to thinking but becomes its own expressive and 
willing agent.  
      Plato's art distilled the proper object of thinking, the concept, out of the rhetorical-
mythopoeic primal soup of the Greek linguistic tradition. It is to this latter, pre-platonic 
standpoint that philosophy, now in its post-philosophical dotage, would have us revert: 
back beyond Protagoras and Thrasymachus, beyond even Parmenides and Heraclitus, into 
some ancient semiotic chaos of pre-rational utterance. The Platonic dialogues also make 
much ado about language, though not as mere hermeneutic exercises themselves, as some 
have averred, but because Plato well knew that language is as much the enemy as the 
friend of thought, just as the body is as much the prison-house as the instrument of the 
                                                
39 In "Plato's Pharmacy" (Dissemination (tr. B. Johnson, Chicago, 1981) Derrida interprets the Phaedrus as 
an attack upon writing. This he bases chiefly on a mythical tale late in the dialogue wherein the inventor of 
writing offers the art to the king describing it as a "remedy" for the enhancement of wisdom; only to be 
reminded by the king that the inscription of intelligence in writing can also have a fossilizing effect that can 
actually serve and further ignorance. Through multiple plays on words (pharmakon can mean a drug or 
poison as well as a remedy), references to the hiding of books under cloaks, the alleged 'repressive' 
significance of the king's fatherly negation of writing and so on, Derrida manages completely to corrupt the 
plain sense of the Phaedrus into a diatribe against writing, when on a plainer reading it is clearly not so 
much about any conflict between speaking and writing as about the proper and improper (i.e., sophistic) 
uses of both spoken and written language.  
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soul. Philosophy, the discipline of the idea, was conceived and explicitly described by 
him as devoted to the overcoming of this bondage, to the liberation of thought from the 
tyranny of words. Thus the Socratic daemon refused to allow the soul's insight into its 
higher life  its essential freedom  to become entangled in nets of metaphor and sophistry, 
of customary meaning and mere asseveration. Plato likewise called every linguistic 
appearance into account, subjecting it to the standard of a dynamic logos present in but 
not captive to language, knowing language itself as nothing else but the soul's own free 
creation.  
 
